AI and the future of work: where I stand
Will AI leave us with a lasting shortage of paid work? This page sets out my reasoning and the reading behind it, so you can check my arguments against the sources and disagree with them properly.
First, what I am and am not saying. I am not saying every job disappears, and I am not saying the next five years will look like mass unemployment. My claim is narrower: new jobs and new demand may not be enough to replace the demand for human work that AI removes. The strongest sources I have read call this possible, not inevitable. I think it is likely enough to plan for.
My three arguments
1. The exits are closing
The usual answer to automation is that people move into the work machines cannot do. That answer assumed the remaining work was a stable place to go. Daniel Susskind calls the pattern “task encroachment”: machines keep entering areas once reserved for people, first manual work, then cognitive work, and increasingly emotional and social work too. If AI can also do the new tasks we would move to, the old escape route narrows. Retraining only helps if there is enough work to retrain into. Susskind separates frictional unemployment (there is work, but people struggle to reach it) from structural unemployment (there is not enough demand for human work). Education and training answer the first problem. They do not answer the second.
I do not expect this to happen everywhere at once. Regulation will slow it in fields such as healthcare and law, and some tasks will lag for technical reasons. But slower is not stopped: encroachment does not need to be simultaneous to be structural. A delay changes the timeline, not the direction.
2. Working with AI is a phase, not a destination
“AI won’t take your job, someone using AI will” is comforting, and it is true for now. But look at chess. After Deep Blue beat Kasparov, human-plus-computer “centaur” teams beat computers alone for a while. Then systems like AlphaZero trained themselves and the human contribution became hard to identify. Susskind uses this example for exactly this reason: complementarity holds only while people add something machines cannot supply. Working alongside AI can be a stage on the way, not a permanent place to stand.
3. A richer economy does not automatically employ more people
The optimistic case rests on productivity: AI makes us richer, and richer economies create work. But output and employment have come apart before. Agriculture and industry both became far more productive while employing a shrinking share of the workforce, and what absorbed the workers was new kinds of work. Whether new demand does that again depends on whether people can still do that work better than machines. A paper by Ping Wang and Tsz-Nga Wong models one scenario where large productivity gains coexist with persistent employment losses. It is one model outcome under stated assumptions, and the same paper also finds scenarios with employment gains. I use it to challenge “higher productivity automatically means enough jobs”, not as a forecast.
Reading and listening
Descriptions say what each source argues and where it is limited.
Start here
- Daniel Susskind, “A World Without Work” (Gresham College lecture, April 2026) - the clearest account of why technology could eventually leave too little demand for human work. Susskind calls the structural scenario possible, not inevitable.
- AI 2027, Daniel Kokotajlo, Scott Alexander, Thomas Larsen, Eli Lifland and Romeo Dean - a detailed scenario of how AI capabilities could advance by 2027. A forecast exercise, not a prediction.
- Ping Wang and Tsz-Nga Wong, “Artificial Intelligence and Technological Unemployment” (NBER working paper; published in the Journal of Monetary Economics, March 2026) - a model where big productivity gains and lasting job losses coexist. A conditional scenario, not an observed result.
Books
- Ethan Mollick, Co-Intelligence: Living and Working with AI (2024) - a practical guide to living and working with AI.
- Daniel Susskind, Growth: A Reckoning (2024) - Susskind on the limits and tradeoffs of growth.
- Daniel Susskind, A World Without Work (2020) - task encroachment, distribution, and the limits of assuming past job creation will repeat.
- Daron Acemoglu & Simon Johnson, Power and Progress (2023) - technology’s gains depend on choices and institutions.
- Tyler Cowen, Average Is Over (2013) - Cowen on the hollowing out of the middle in the machine age.
Papers
- Daniel Susskind, “A Model of Technological Unemployment” - the theory behind task encroachment, including the assumptions on which the pessimistic result depends.
- Carl Benedikt Frey and Michael Osborne, “The Future of Employment” (2017) - estimates how exposed 702 US occupations are to computerisation. The famous 47% figure measures exposure, not jobs lost.
- Fabio D’Orlando, “AI Diffusion and the Possibility of Full Unemployment” (2026) - argues full unemployment deserves theoretical study even if unlikely. A conceptual argument, not evidence about likelihood.
Podcasts and talks
- Dwarkesh Podcast: Alex Imas & Phil Trammell, “What remains scarce after AGI?” (June 2026)
- Future of Life Institute: Preparing for an AI economy, with Daniel Susskind
- IMF podcast with Carl Benedikt Frey (September 2025)
- Futures Podcast: Martin Ford
If you have recommendations, please email me at hello@inessilva.me.